The French Political Ongoing Crisis: The Dawn of a New Political Era
In October 2022, when Rishi Sunak assumed office as the UK's leader, he became the fifth consecutive UK leader to take up the position over a six-year span.
Triggered in the UK by Britain's EU exit, this represented exceptional governmental instability. So what term captures what is occurring in the French Republic, now on its fifth premier in two years – three of them in the last ten months?
The current premier, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in exchange for opposition Socialist votes as the price for his administration's continuation.
But it is, at best, a short-term solution. The EU’s second-largest economy is trapped in a political permacrisis, the scale of which it has not experienced for many years – perhaps not since the establishment of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no simple way out.
Minority Rule
Essential context: ever since Macron initiated an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, the nation has had a hung parliament split into three warring blocs – the left, far right and his own centre-right alliance – none with anything close to a majority.
At the same time, the nation faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now nearly double the EU limit, and strict legal timelines to pass a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.
Against that unforgiving backdrop, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.
In September, the leader named his trusted associate Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which proved to be largely unchanged from before – he encountered anger from both supporters and rivals.
So much so that the next day, he resigned. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in recent French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “party loyalties” and “personal ambitions” would make his job all but impossible.
A further unexpected development: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for another 48 hours in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a task, to put it gently, not without complications.
Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and leftist LFI declined to engage with Lecornu, vowing to reject any and every new government unless there were snap elections.
Lecornu stuck at his job, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the end of his 48 hours, he appeared on television to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to avoid elections. The president’s office announced the president would name a fresh premier 48 hours later.
Macron honored his word – and on Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So recently – with Macron commenting from the wings that the nation's opposing groups were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?
In a critical address, the young prime minister outlined his financial plans, giving the centre-left Socialist party (PS), who detest Macron’s controversial pension changes, what they were expecting: Macron’s flagship reform would be suspended until 2027.
With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already on board, the Socialists said they would not back censorship votes tabled against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the government should survive those votes, scheduled for Thursday.
It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS clearly stated that it would be seeking more concessions. “This move,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”
A Cultural Shift
The problem is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the right-leaning parties are themselves split on dealing with the administration – some are still itching to topple it.
A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the far-right RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.
To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in 24 months is, similar to his forerunners, finished.
Most expect this to occur soon. Although, by some miracle, the dysfunctional assembly summons up the collective responsibility to approve a budget this year, the outlook afterward look bleak.
So does an exit exist? Snap elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: surveys indicate pretty much every party bar the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A fresh premier would confront identical numerical challenges.
Another possibility might be for Macron himself to resign. After winning the presidential election, his replacement would disband the assembly and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the following election. But this also remains unclear.
Surveys show the future president will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that French electorate, having elected a far-right president, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.
Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that decisive majorities are a thing of the past, absolute victory is obsolete, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.
Many think that cultural shift will not be feasible under the existing governmental framework. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.
“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances typical across Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”